NSL Update 12-27-01
By JACK DORSEY, The
Virginian-Pilot
December 26, 2001
NORFOLK -- The nation's submarine force has returned to the Cold War days of the
"Silent Service," a reference not only to its stealthiness but also to a desire
that no one talk about its operations.
No longer will the names of deploying submarines be routinely announced, nor
will the times of their arrival home. Someone may know a submarine has left
port, but they will not know why, or where it is going, according to new rules
from its force commander.
"Submarines are valuable because of their secrecy and surprise, said Vice Adm.
John J. Grossenbacher, Commander Naval Submarine Forces, headquartered in
Norfolk.
"The last thing we want to do is help the people we are fighting by giving them
the knowledge of what we can do and are doing."
Grossenbacher, who has operational control of all Atlantic Fleet submarines but
speaks for the Pacific Fleet units as well under a realignment last year, said
he is concerned about too much information being released about his subs,
especially now that the nation is at war.
"In the past, we were always very comfortable in saying we don't discuss
submarine operations," he said in an interview.
"Then, at the end of the Cold War, we slipped away from that. Part of it was a
conscious decision because the country was trying to figure out what it needed a
military for and, with the peace dividend, what we should do with all of these
things."
Also, from an historical viewpoint, submarine sailors wanted to talk about their
successes, he said.
A nuclear-powered submarine, like an aircraft carrier, is very much a symbol of
American military might, he said.
"It is very technological. It is a very sexy target for a terrorist."
In a wide-ranging interview, Grossenbacher also discussed changes in the fleet
since the Sept. 11 [2001] attacks, the need for more submarines, the Navy's role in the Kursk recovery efforts, and safety concerns that surfaced after the Greeneville
tragedy earlier this year. While the war being waged in Afghanistan has largely
been an air and ground campaign, Grossenbacher -- despite his own admonishments
-- noted that "a significant number of the Tomahawk missile strikes were
conducted by submarines."
The fast-attack submarines Providence, from the Atlantic Fleet, and the Key
West, from Hawaii, were among the early units to fire the long-range cruise
missiles, he said.
"The demand for submarines is very high in the campaign against terrorism,"
Grossenbacher said. "In fact, demand exceeds supply, which is one of our current
challenges."
Since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11 [2001], the submarine force has changed, he
said.
Force protection is paramount.
"We were resolved" after the attack in Yemen on the Norfolk-based destroyer Cole
"not to allow a successful terrorist attack against one of our submarines," he
said.
Submarine crews have been given guidance on how to prepare for the war and how
to respond if the nation must surge a large number of submarines, along with
their missiles and torpedoes, he said, adding: "They know their schedule can
change overnight."
Limited resources still prevent him from doing all he wants to do, Grossenbacher
said.
During the Cold War, the nation's submarine force was to have grown to 100
fast-attack vessels. The number at one point rose to the mid-90s but has
dwindled to 55 today, about half based on each coast.
In addition, significant maintenance issues -- 20 percent to 25 percent of the
fast-attack sub force is in shipyard overhaul at all times -- put even more
pressure on the system, according to the three-star admiral.
Beefing up the submarine force, or at least determining what size it should be,
has become a major source of discussion over the years.
"I honestly think the number of attack submarines we need is the most studied
force structure issue in the entire U.S. military," Grossenbacher said.
The bottom line is that in order to satisfy everyone's needs, the number is
about 70.
An unclassified account of the 1999 attack-submarine study by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff reached three conclusions: That 68 fast-attack submarines, or SSNs, in
the year 2015 and 76 in the 2025 time frame would meet all the needs of the
commander-in-chiefs, or CINCs.
That a force structure below 55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025 would leave the
CINCs insufficient capability to respond to urgent demands without skipping
other requirements.
That to counter the need for greater technology, 18 Virginia-class SSNs would be
needed by 2015.
That plan, said Grossenbacher, is fine. But getting there will be difficult.
Under the plan, the Navy can refuel only two of its Los Angeles-class nuclear
submarines in order to extend their usefulness.
The only other way to increase the force is to build more Virginia-class subs
faster. Currently, the Navy is building only one sub per year. That means that
in 30 years, it will only have 30 ships because of the attrition of older
fast-attack subs, which have a life span of 20 to 30 years.
"So, if you want to ramp up, you need to build two a year," he said. "They are
expensive, and it is difficult because it takes six years to build a submarine.
So there is no instant gratification. You don't get them overnight."
The war on terrorism has raised a number of questions for the submarine force
and its future, Grossenbacher said.
There continues to be high interest in converting some of the force's Trident
submarines.
The Navy operates 18 Trident strategic missile submarines, or SSBNs, of the Ohio
class. Four are scheduled to be taken out of service in the next few years to
reach the approved force level of 14 SSBNs carrying 336 submarine-launched
ballistic missiles.
There are proposals to convert the four SSBNs to cruise-missile ships, or troop
carriers for Special Operations forces.
Grossenbacher likes the proposal, saying the former SSBNs would be perfect
matches for the needs of the future.
Built to last more than 40 years, the four Ohio-class submarines being
considered for conversion are all under 20 years old. They likely would have to
be refueled.
"If they are not needed for strategic service, then for the price of refueling,
we get these magnificent ships," Grossenbacher said. "And we get what we've
never had -- a submarine with a significant payload capability."
The Tridents are huge, at 18,000 tons. Their 24 missile tubes could be converted
to hold Tomahawk cruise missiles, up to 154 of them.
There is potential for them to carry unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned
undersea vehicles as well, he said.
They could carry just about any type of missile in the military's inventory.
Tragedy and innocent deaths have followed the Navy's 100th anniversary of
submarine service.
The Russian submarine Kursk apparently suffered an onboard explosion while
submerged in the Barents Sea on Aug. 12, 2000, sinking in more than 300 feet of
water and killing all 118 crewmen.
The Kursk "is a reminder of what a dangerous business the submarine is when
combined with a high-powered weapon in close environment," Grossenbacher said.
"Watching the pain the Russians suffered and not being able to promptly rescue
however many of the crew survived the initial explosion and sinking of the ship
really resonates with us."
The Navy offered its assistance and met in Grossenbacher's headquarters to
formulate plans for a rescue. But the help was turned down.
But it made the submarine force think, he said.
Submarines are operating more along the coasts, he said.
That means that if they have a collision, there is a higher probability they may
be on the bottom in salvageable waters, not in the miles-deep canyons that can't
be reached by rescue crews.
On the other hand, in shallow water there are a lot more things to run into,
such as fishermen and their nets.
"So it caused us to do a very thorough review of our submarine rescue and escape
capability," Grossenbacher said, "and, by and large, I think we are pretty
satisfied with where we are and the capability we have today and where we are
headed off in the future."
One result of the review was the decision to add more carbon-dioxide-removal
capability to submarines.
"People are not asphyxiated on the bottom for lack of oxygen," he said; it is
the buildup of carbon dioxide that causes death. The Navy now has chemicals that
can remove it.
"It will make it easier for us to sustain our crews on the bottom longer," he
said.
U.S. submarine forces have also looked at international agreements and
international cooperation in submarine rescue with the idea of encouraging
expansion in membership, thereby increasing the chance for survival.
The collision of the American submarine Greeneville with a Japanese research
ship was not only a preventable tragedy, but an embarrassment for the entire
submarine service, Grossenbacher said.
It occurred Feb. 9 [2001]in waters off Honolulu when the submarine demonstrated
an emergency surfacing procedure and struck the Ehime Maru, sinking it with 35
people aboard, including several young students. Nine people died.
"The way we approached the problem was to say that, regardless of the people and
the personalities . . . that performance was totally unacceptable,"
Grossenbacher said. ``We are better than that. Why did it happen? Why didn't we
prevent it from happening?"
The board of inquiry handed the force a lengthy action list of issues to be
concerned about, he said.
"We found some things we needed to tighten up and change," he said. "We learned
a lot from Greeneville. The Greeneville was not the product of one captain and
one crew. It doesn't work that way. She was the product of the submarine force
and it was hard for us because Greeneville was a real embarrassment for the
submarine force. We all think we are better than that. We need to be better than
that."