(Edited from U.S. SUBMARINE OPERATIONS, WW-II, U.S. NAVAL
INSTITUTE)
ARCHERFISH (CDR J.F. Enright) left Saipan on November 11, 1944,
to conduct her fifth war patrol. Out of Portsmouth Navy Yard in
1943, the submarine had met with indifferent luck thus far, and
there was nothing in the cards to indicate a change. From Saipan
she headed north to patrol in waters of "Hit Parade."
Her assigned area lay about 150 miles south of Tokyo - a stretch
of water due north of Hachijo Jima in the Nanpo Shoto chain.
Once an Empire main line from Japan to the Marianas, the Nanpo
Shoto islands were now landmarks on the B-29 main line from the
Marianas to Japan. ARCHERFISH's primery mission was to act as
lifeguard for the first B-29 strikes on Tokyo. She was also to
engage in offensive patrolling and shoot at any targets that came
her way. But Enright was not anticipating much shooting. American
Superforts droned in the sky. ARCHERFISH was not long out before
she made contact with three friendly submarines. It could be
assumed Japanese shipping would avoid this lively area. And the
first days of patrol substantiated the assumption. Three small
vessels came along, but they were too insignificant to warrant an
expenditure of torpedoes. Enright and company watch the air show;
otherwise submarining was slow in the Nanpo Shotos.
Early in the morning of November 28, ARCHERFISH received word
there would be no air raid that day and she was therefore free
from lifeguard duties until further notice. The day was a round of
routine monotony. But that evening, when the submarine was about
12 miles off Inamba Shima, something happened. It happened at 2048
- radar contact at long range, bearing 028 T. Enright set the
machinery in motion and started tracking from ahead.
Within an hour the target was identified as an aircraft
carrier, on base course 210, making 20 knots and zigzagging. Only
one escort could be located. The sky was overcast but bright
moonlight seeped through the clouds, and visibility was good for
about 15,000 yards. The horizon was dark to the north, so Enright
started his approach on the enemy's starboard flank.
At 2230 an escort was sighted on the target's starboard beam.
The position maintained by this escort conspired with visibility
conditions to rule out a surface approach on the target from that
side. Enright therefore changed course back to the base course. At
2250 the range was decreasing but ARCHERFISH was too far off the
track to close in with a submerged approach. Range to the escort
was 6,100 yards, and the carrier was 15,000 yards away. So,
Enright held the submarine on the surface and drove in.
As the range shortened, he sent his lookouts below, and,
awaiting gun flashes and splashes, braced himself on the bridge.
He could now make out the target as a large carrier in a cordon of
four escorts - one on either beam, one ahead and one astern. A
surface attack seemed out of the question, but there was little
chance of the submarine's regaining the ahead position required
for a submerged approach.
Enright sent out a contact report, hoping to guide some other
submarine into an intercepting position. The carrier group was
making one full knot better than ARCHERFISH could do at her best.
Strive as she would, Enright's submarine was slowly falling
behind, and it was evident to her skipper that she would end up
far in the rear unless the enemy made an accommodating zig or zag.
As it was, the enemy was doing his best to accommodate, but his
zags and zigs were not angular enough. However, by careful
maneuvering and paralleling the base course, ARCHERFISH managed to
hang on.ARCHERFISH vs SHINANO (No. 1 on the Hit Parade!)
Many are the pros and cons with
regard to zigzagging as a submarine defense. Obviously a target
traveling on a straight course at a uniform speed presents the
easiest fire control problem to the tracking submarine. On the
other hand, zigzagging seldom baffles a well-trained fire control
party with modern instruments. The chance that a sudden swerve by
the target will adversely affect the submarine's position after
she is all set for the attack is about offset by the chance that
such a maneuver will improve the submarine's position.
There remains the possibility that the target will veer
immediately after the torpedoes are fired. But such a
course-change would amount to correct evasive action taken before
torpedoes had been sighted. So the odds are about Even Stephen.
But no navigator - certainly none of Japanese extraction - could
deny that zigzagging increases the number of miles steamed in
submarine waters, and thereby increases the chances of submarine
attack.
Moreover, the reduction of target speed, caused by zigzagging,
may be just sufficient to enable the submarine to gain an attack
position when otherwise it would be left behind. Whatever the
theoretical arguments, it remains a fact that ARCHERFISH's target
would have escaped had the navigators main- tained a straight
course.
At 2340 the target group made a radical course change - a
change in the base course to the west. ARCHERFISH was now on the
port flank and farther off the track than before. She hung on
desperately as the "black gang" coaxed a few more turns
from the overloaded engines. The chase went on through midnight
and into the morning of November 29th. The enemy's zigzag plan
allowed the submarine to pull ahead - slowly - slowly. But at 0241
it was obvious that if the carrier held to her base course of 275,
the ARCHERFISH situation would be hopeless. Enright sent out a
second contact report.
Then came the break. At 0300 the target group made another
radical change in course, this time veering to the southwest. The
range began to close rapidly, and ARCHERFISH was ahead. The long
chase was nearly over. Patience and perseverance were about to
move a mountain.
At 0305 Enright came to course 100 and ordered the submarine
under. Range to the carrier when ARCHERFISH submerged was 11,700
yards. At 7,000 yards the target could be seen through the
periscope. Wait - that baby was going to pass too close! Enright
changed course 10-degrees to the left, and now the range shortened
to 3,500 yards. At about this point the starboard escort
approached the carrier to receive a blinker message. This caused
the escort to pass ahead of ARCHERFISH at only 400 yards. The move
also served to get the escort out of the way.
At 0316, the carrier zigged away from the submarine. This move
put the queen right where Enright wanted her. ARCHERFISH had been
a little too close to the target, and the zig gave her a nice
position: 1,400 yards range with a 70-degree starboard track.
Because of the late zig, Enright had to accept a larger than
normal gyro angle. No matter. At 0317 he fired the first shot of a
six-torpedo salvo - Mark 14's set for 10 feet and spread to smash
into the target from stern to bow.
Forty-seven seconds later Enright saw and heard the first
torpedo hit just inside the carrier's stern, near the propellers
and rudder. A great glowing ball of fire climbed the vessel's
side, Then another torpedo smashed home.
Enright ordered the submarine deep to evade the inevitable
counter-attack. As ARCHERFISH went down, four more timed hits were
heard. Breaking-up noises hissed and crackled in the sound gear.
Fourteen depth charges boomed in the sea, the nearest some 300
yards away. The last charge thundered at 0345, but the clash and
crackle of a great ship disintegrating deep under the sea
continued for another 20 minutes. Finally, silence.
At 0614, Enright put up the periscope for a look. Nothing in
sight. Four hours later a thunderous explosion was heard, it
source a mystery. Whatever the origin, it came as a salute to the
victors of the greatest undersea battle fought in "Hit
Parade."
Enright identified the target as a vessel of HAYATAKA class and
accordingly claimed credit for sinking a 29,000 ton aircraft
carrier. The facts did not come to light until V-J Day. The
Japanese super battleships YAMATO and MUSASHI, mounting 18-inch
guns, were the largest men-of-war ever built by any nation. The
allies were aware that the keel had been laid for a third behemoth
of this class - a giant sister to the other two. The name and
where abouts of this third monster remained unknown to the Allies
until the cessation of hostilities. Then it was learned that the
huge vessel had been converted into a super-aircraft carrier named
SHINANO. And her whereabouts was latitude 32.00N, 137.00E, where
ARCHERFISH had caught and sunk her in the waters of "Hit
Parade."
Commissioned on November 18, 1944, SHINANO was torpedoed just
10 days later while on her maiden voyage to a safe port for
fitting out. SHINANO had a standard displacement of 59,000 tons.
Enright and company sank the largest man-of-war ever downed by a
submarine. ARCHERFISH leads the hit parade in world history!