Collision course - Navy relieves carrier CO

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Subject: Collision course -- Navy relieves carrier CO

Collision course Navy relieves carrier CO

By Christopher Munsey
NavyTimes staff writer
6 September 2004 Issue


Thirteen miles of distance and 28 minutes of time initially stood between the aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy and a small wooden dhow in the Persian Gulf the night of July 22. Despite that advance warning, however, the 82,000-ton warship plowed over the smaller craft, sending it and its crew to the bottom of the gulf, and sinking the career of yet one more decorated Navy skipper. Perhaps worse, it also set off a firestorm of controversy as to how the dhow got so close to the massive carrier — and what might have happened had the dhow been a bomb-laden terror weapon.

More than a month after the collision that remains largely shrouded in investigative secrecy, Capt. Stephen G. Squires, Kennedy’s commanding officer, was relieved of command by Vice Adm. David C. Nichols, commander of 5th Fleet in Bahrain, on Aug. 27.He becomes at least the 11th Navy CO fired in 2004.Nichols relieved the 47-year-old Squires following a review of the Navy’s collision investigation, officials said, saying the three-star had “lost confidence” in Squires’ leadership.“It was pretty much a loss of confidence to operate the ship safely,” said Cmdr. Ed Buclatin, spokesman for commander, Naval Air Force Pacific Fleet in San Diego.

Buclatin described Nichols’ decision as an “administrative action,” noting decisions about possible nonjudicial punishment had not yet been made. As of Aug. 27, no other Kennedy crew members had been relieved or reassigned as a result of the investigation, he said. The Navy released only the barest of details from its follow-up investigation of the collision, and that information raises more questions than answers. Key among them: What force-protection measures were in place before and after contact? What decisions were made regarding the maneuvering of the carrier once the dhow was spotted? Who decided the dhow was or wasn’t a terrorist threat? How did the dhow get close enough to hit the carrier? Did the ship’s crew fail the skipper, or was it the other way around? A source familiar with the investigation said the initial information about the dhow’s presence was properly relayed within the carrier’s combat information center and the bridge navigation team during the 28 minutes before the collision.“

They just failed to take the appropriate measures they needed to take to avoid the collision they saw coming,” the source said. Exactly what that means has not been publicly answered. The source could not elaborate. Watchstanders in the carrier’s CIC use a battery of radars to monitor surface and air traffic near the carrier, while members of the navigation team up on the bridge watch for surface contacts, both visually and with radar.

Kennedy also has navigation lookouts posted all around the ship responsible for spotting and reporting contacts. It also has ship’s force protection armed with small arms and crew-served weapons, keeping watch for threats. Weather was not mentioned as a factor in the collision, the source said.While terrorists have used dhows and other small boats for attacks in the region, investigators don’t believe terrorism played a role.“There’s nothing about this incident that leads us to believe there was terrorist intent,” the source said.No one is saying how large the dhow was, or what its course and speed were.

The fact that a suspicious boat hit the hull of a carrier, however, raises serious security concerns. The carrier, which is supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom, arrived in the gulf in early July, leaving its home port of Mayport, Fla., on June 7. Squires took over as CO in April.

28 minutes, few details

On the night of July 22, Kennedy started a cycle of night flight operations about 45 minutes before the collision.The British Royal Navy frigate Somerset was serving as plane guard, but no other Navy vessels were in the vicinity.Squires was not on the bridge when the dhow was first spotted, Buclatin said. If the commanding officer is not on the bridge during flight operations, a “command duty officer” appointed by the CO is on the bridge, Buclatin said. At some point, Squires was called to the bridge before the collision because of the dhow’s presence, Buclatin said.He said the Kennedy tried to contact the dhow via bridge-to-bridge radio, but got no response.What happened in the next 28 minutes, however, remains unclear. Buclatin could not provide further details, citing the ongoing investigation.

According to The Associated Press, which spoke to several Navy officials, some on the condition of anonymity, a decision was later made aboard the carrier to land an incoming F-14 Tomcat in the last moments before the collision.After the F-14 landed safely, the carrier steered hard to one side in an attempt to avoid the dhow. As the carrier veered, the F-14 skidded into an F/A-18 Hornet secured on the flight deck. Both planes sustained minor damage, but no one was injured.At some point, two people were spotted aboard the dhow before the collision, Buclatin said. Kennedy and Somerset launched boats and aircraft to search for survivors, but only a small area of floating debris was found.Dhows are regional watercraft used for trade, fishing and recreation. In the weeks after the collision, authorities from the local gulf states have not reported any vessels missing, and no bodies were ever recovered.I

Interim command

An interim skipper, Capt. John W. Miller, assumed command of Kennedy on Aug. 27. Miller’s most recent command was of the decommissioned carrier Constellation.He is Kennedy’s fifth commanding officer in the past three years. Squires is the second Kennedy skipper who has been relieved for loss of confidence in recent years.In December 2001, Capt. Maurice Joyce was relieved shortly before the carrier was to deploy overseas, following a disastrous material inspection.Squires has been temporarily assigned to commander, Carrier Group 6 in Mayport.The results of the investigation are now making their way up the Navy’s chain of command, to determine whether further action will be taken against Squires or any other members of Kennedy’s crew, Buclatin said.

A decision on whether to hold an admiral’s mast for Squires will be made by Vice Adm. James Zortman, commander, Naval Air Forces, he said.The relief marked an early end to Squires’ second tour as a ship CO. Ironically, in July 2000, Squires took over as CO of the amphibious transport dock ship Denver two months early, after its skipper was relieved of command following a collision with the oiler Yukon during an underway replenishment.Squires is a Class of 1979 Naval Academy graduate whose service includes 89 combat sorties as an E-2C Hawkeye pilot.

The action against Squires comes at a time when the Navy is reviewing its selection and training process for commanding officers, due to a troubling spike in the number of fired skippers. Squires was at least the 11th CO to be relieved in 2004 and the 28th since February 2003.In June, Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Mullen ordered the Naval inspector general to conduct a formal investigation into the trend.The review is examining why 80 commanding officers have been fired over the past five years, a Navy spokesman at the Pentagon said.Results of the investigation are expected next month, the spokesman said.

The gulf’s challenges

Retired Vice Adm. Hank Giffin commanded the Constellation battle group from 1994 to 1996, during a Persian Gulf deployment. Giffin described the gulf, with its hot and hazy conditions, as one of the “most difficult” places in the world for carrier operations.The gulf has a lot of coastal traffic, and keeping track of it is a constant challenge, he said.Giffin wondered whether radar equipment was able to keep a continuous track of the dhow from the time it was first detected, given a typical boat’s wooden construction and low freeboard above the water.Standard procedure calls for letting the CO know whenever another vessel’s “close point of approach” is judged to be five miles or less.Whatever went wrong, Giffin said, it’s likely other crew members will ultimately bear some responsibility, not just the CO:“It takes a whole series of things to go wrong when something like this happens.” Christopher Munsey can be reached at (703) 750-8674 or e-mail cmunsey@navytimes.com .

Experts discount boat-bomb theory

Navy Times
6 September 2004 Issue

Terrorists have used small boats and dhows to attack ships and oil terminals in the Middle East, but naval analysts say boat-bombs are ineffective weapons against a massive aircraft carrier. Even if the dhow that collided with the carrier John F. Kennedy on July 22 in the Persian Gulf had been packed with explosives, the bulk of the concussive force would have blasted into the open air and not into the ship, said naval author Norman Polmar.

Such an explosion wouldn’t strike beneath the water line, where the ship is most vulnerable, Polmar said. “There’s no danger of sinking,” he said. “It might blow a hole in the side.” 

And the magazines of an aircraft carrier, which contain tons of bombs and missiles, are thickly armored and are deep inside the ship, he said. Even if an explosion did break the hull and cause flooding, a carrier is highly compartmentalized with watertight doors, limiting the volume of space that can be affected, said Ron O’Rourke, a naval analyst with Congressional Research Service.“Whatever is flooded is a proportionally smaller space,” O’Rourke said. — Christopher Munsey
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Contributed,
YNCS Don Harribine, USN(Ret)